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Mr. Justice Douglas
JUDGE ROBERT A. SPRECHER*
On November 12, 1975, Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas concluded
36 years and almost seven months of extraordinary service on the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the longest tenure in the 186-year
history of the Court.' It was fitting that one of his last judicial acts,
concurring in the reversal of a Court of Appeals judgment halting the
construction of a nuclear power plant, advanced one of his most per-
sistent themes-protecting against the abuse of discretionary power by
administrative agencies. Perhaps a brief examination of this and other
positions he took can provide an insight into the temperament and
philosophy of this brilliant jurist.
In this latest case, the Atomic Energy Commission, by general
regulation, limited the location of nuclear power plants to sites at least
a specified number of miles from population centers. After issuing a
construction permit which the Court of Appeals held violated those
regulations,' that agency's successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, amended the regulations in order to permit the deviation.
Although the Supreme Court's reversal did not rely upon the re-
vised regulations, Mr. Justice Douglas said on November 11:
[T]he entire federal bureaucracy is vested with a discretionary power,
against the abuse of which the public needs protection....
[T]he power to change the rules after the contest has been concluded
would once more put the promotion of nuclear energy ahead of the
public's safety.'
Whereas in his dissent in Power Reactor Development Co. v. Inter-
national Union of Electrical Workers4 he had described the construc-
tion given the Atomic Energy Act by the Commission as "a light-hearted
approach to the most awesome, the most deadly, the most dangerous
*United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
' John Marshall, Stephen J. Field, John M. Harlan, and Hugo L. Black had each served
34 years.
2 Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 515 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1975).
'Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of
America, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 3276, 3276-77 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) (Douglas, J., concurring).
4 367 U.S. 396, 416 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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process that man has ever conceived,"' in his last opinion he added that
"[i]f the rules can be changed by the Commission at any time-even
after the hearing is over-the protection afforded by the opposition of
scientific and environmental groups is greatly weakened."6
Mr. Justice Douglas not only sought to protect the individual from
big government but also from monopoly and big business. In Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co! he would have held that a public utility fur-
nishing electric service constituted state action and was subject to the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Bell v. Maryland,'
in concurring in the vacation of convictions of black customers "sitting-
in" a white restaurant, he would have held that state judicial action is
state action and that corporate ownership could not be immunized from
fourteenth amendment standards.
Closely related to his views on nuclear energy was his concern for
the environment. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,' his opinion for the
unanimous Court announced that "when we deal with air and water in
their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law ... ",
In his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton," he revealed judicially his
consuming interest in nature:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put
neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environ-
mental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts
in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced,
or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of
public outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's
ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation....
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has
a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The
corporation soul-a creature of ecclesiastical law-is an acceptable ad-
versary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation
is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it
represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes,
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that
feels the destructive pressures of modem technology and modem life.
The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains
SId. at 419.
644 U.S.L.W. at 3277.
7 419 U.S. 345, 359 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
8378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964) (Douglas, 3., concurring).
9406 U.S. 91 (1972).
'o 1d. at 103.
I1 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, I., dissenting).
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or nourishes-fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer,
elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on
it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as
plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those
people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water-whether
it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger-must be able
to speak for the values which the river represents and which are
threatened with destruction.
The voice of the inanimate object, therefore, should not be stilled.
That does not mean that the judiciary takes over the managerial func-
tions from the federal agency. It merely means that before these
priceless bits of Americana (such as a valley, an alpine meadow, a
river, or a lake) are forever lost or are so transformed as to be re-
duced to the eventual rubble of our urban environment, the voice of
the existing beneficiaries of these environmental wonders should be
heard.
• ..That is why these environmental issues should be tendered
by the inanimate object itself. Then there will be assurances that all
of the forms of life which it represents will stand before the court-
the pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings
as well as the trout in the streams. Those inarticulate members of the
ecological group cannot speak. But those people who have so fre-
quented the place as to know its values and wonders will be able to
speak for the entire ecological community.2
Mr. Justice Douglas' fierce devotion to the first amendment was
manifested in every conceivable way, but possibly most sharply in the
area of libel law. He joined Mr. Justice Black in concurring in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan"3 on the basis that the first and fourteenth
amendments "completely prohibit" a state from awarding damages to
a public official against critics of his official conduct, and thus eliminated
the Court's loophole-unless plaintiff proves that the statement was
made With "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.1 4
The Black-Douglas theory of absolute immunity for the press"
and for others speaking out on public issues enabled them to agree
12 Id. at 741, 742-43, 749-50, 752 (citations omitted).
13 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
14 id. at 279-80.
"s See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Black, J., con-
curring and dissenting):
[T]he New York Times constitutional rule concerning libel is wholly inadequate to
save the press from being destroyed by libel judgments....
[I]t is time for this Court to abandon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and
to adopt the rule to the effect that the First Amendment was intended to leave




easily in favor of libel defendants as the Court struggled to define "pub-
lic official" as including "at the very least.., those among the hierarchy
of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over governmental affairs."'"
Mr. Justice Douglas perceived that "[w]e now have the question as
to ... how far down the hierarchy we should go." 7 He saw "no way
to draw lines that exclude the night watchman, the file clerk, the typist,
or, for that matter, anyone on the public payroll."' " Black and Douglas
were again able to agree readily in, favor of libel defendants when the
New York Times rule was expanded to candidates for office" and "pub-
lic figures."2
When Gertz2' was decided, holding that a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public
official nor a public figure may not claim the New York Times protec-
tion against liability, Mr. Justice Douglas dissented and stated his posi-
tion on libel in the broadest possible terms:
I have stated before my view that the First Amendment would bar
Congress from passing any libel law....
With the First Amendment made applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth, I do not see how States have any more ability to "ac-
commodate" freedoms of speech or of the press than does Congress.22
He refused to go so far as to say that the first amendment pro-
hibited all libel actions, but he did conclude that it certainly prohibited
all libel actions involving "public affairs," which he defined as "a great
deal more than merely political affairs," and including matters of "sci-
ence, economics, business, art, literature, . . . all matters of interest to
the general public, . . . any matter of sufficient general interest to
prompt media coverage, . . . police killings, 'Communist conspiracies,'
and the like . . .. ,2"
6 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
' Id. at 88 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 89.
"9Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (Black, J., concurring in
judgment). The Court itself greatly broadened "official conduct" as well, saying:
Any test adequate to safeguard First Amendment guarantees in this area must go
far beyond the customary meaning of the phrase "official conduct." Given the
realities of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements about
a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office
he seeks.
Id. at 275-76.2 0 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 24 (1970)
(Black, J., concurring in judgment).
21 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
22 Id. at 356-57 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2 31d. at 357 n.6.
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When the Court applied the New York Times rule of knowing or
reckless disregard to criminal libel as well as to civil libel, Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred:
I am in hearty agreement with the conclusion of the Court that
this prosecution for seditious libel was unconstitutional. Yet I feel
that the gloss which the Court has put on "the freedom of speech"
in the First Amendment to reach that result ...makes that basic
guarantee almost unrecognizable. 4
When the Court applied the New York Times rule to non-defama-
tory invasions of privacy, Mr. Justice Douglas concurred but added:
The exception for "knowing and reckless falsity" is therefore, in
my view, an abridgment of speech that is barred by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.2
He reiterated his absolute immunity position in invasion of privacy
cases in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 6 where he said in concurring
that "the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth, prohibits the use of state law 'to impose damages for merely
discussing public affairs ...
It was this broad interpretation of first amendment rights that led
him to concur only in the result when the Court applied the New York
Times rule by analogy to libels committed during labor disputes, through
the use of the doctrine of partial pre-emption of state rights by federal
labor law,"8 and to concur only in the judgment when the Court applied
the New York Times test to reverse the dismissal of a public high school
teacher for critical statements about the school board.2"
24 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring). In Ashton
v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966), Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for a unanimous
Court holding a Kentucky criminal libel law unconstitutional, but for vagueness. However,
he wrote:
Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amend-
ment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regu-
latory conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the
press suffer.
Id. at 200.
2 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 402 (1967) (Douglas, 3., concurring).
26 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
271d. at 500 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also his dissent in Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 254 (1974), where the Court upheld a jury verdict for com-
pensatory damages for invasion of privacy. It is interesting to note that although Mr.
justice Douglas was known as the crystallizer if not the creator of the right of privacy,
when that right collided with freedom of speech, he opted for the latter.
28 Letter Carriers Branch 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 287 (1974) (Douglas, J., con-
curring in the result).




Mr. Justice Douglas also believed that any state or federal ban on,
or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution."0 He also
believed that the Constitution prohibits retroactive application of judi-
cially improvised obscenity standards.'
In all of these areas where the first amendment operates, he took
the strongest possible position favoring free speech and free press. To-
gether with Mr. Justice Black, while he was on the Court, Justice
Douglas believed that the first amendment freedoms held a preferred
position among the constitutional rights inasmuch as the first amend-
ment begins with "Congress shall make no law respecting . . ." while
the other amendments tend to be equivocal, speaking of unreasonable
searches and seizures, deprivations without due process of law and the
taking of private property without just compensation. 2
Of even more immediate importance to the development of the
law than his first amendment views was Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion
for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,33 where he announced "the
new constitutional right of privacy.""' Griswold held that a Connecticut
statute forbidding the use of contraceptives as applied to married per-
sons violated the fourteenth amendment. In a remarkably concise and
pertinent opinion, Justice Douglas held that "the First Amendment has
a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.""
Drawing also upon penumbras of the third amendment prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers, the fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the fifth amendment guar-
antee against self-incrimination, and the other retained rights of the
ninth amendment, but primarily upon freedom of association, drawn in
turn from the right to assemble of the first amendment, he developed
and crystallized the then novel" but now highly significant right of
privacy, reasoning that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
3 0 In this regard, he developed an almost uniform dissent to the denial of certiorari in
obscenity cases. Cf. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc. v. United States, 419 U.S. 1007 (1974);
Ayre v. Maryland, 419 U.S. 1073 (1974). He would state that he would grant certiorari
and summarily reverse the judgment, citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 42-47 (1973) (Douglas, 3., dis-
senting); and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, 3.,
dissenting).
3' Divine v. Amato, 419 U.S. 1014, 1015 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33 W.F. MuIPana & C.H. P=CHe-, Con-rS, JuDcEs PoAN cs: AN I-mroucroN
TO THE JuDICaAL PRocEss 627 (1961).
33 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34 Id. at 530 n.7 (Stewart, 3., dissenting).
35 Id. at 483.
16 Douglas himself viewed the right of privacy as "older than the Bill of Rights-
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them life and substance" and the "[v]arious guarantees' create zones
of privacy. '
Mr. Justice Douglas' strong view of the independence of judges re-
flected his own independence, as well as giving nourishment and com-
fort to all federal judges. In Chandler v. Judicial Council" he said:
An independent judiciary is one of this Nation's outstanding char-
acteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate and takes
his oath, he is independent of every other judge. He commonly works
with other federal judges who are likewise sovereign. But neither one
alone nor any number banded together can act as censor and place
sanctions on him. Under the Constitution the only leverage that can
be asserted against him is impeachment, where pursuant to a resolu-
tion passed by the House, he is tried by the Senate, sitting as a jury.39
He also spoke of the hardiness of judges, in terms which sounded
like self-description. He said in Craig v. Harvey :40
[T]he law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who
may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed
to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.'
Lawyers throughout the country, many of whom are frequently
called upon to draft court rules, must have been interested and possibly
amused by Mr. Justice Douglas' view of the court rule-making func-
tion. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 provides that "the Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe by general rules . . . the practice and procedure
of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil
actions .... "
Justices Black and Douglas said:
The present rules ... are not prepared by us but by the Committees
of the Judicial Conference designated by the Chief Justice, and before
coming to us they are approved by the Judicial Conference . .. . It
is they . . . who do the work, not we, and the rules have only our
imprimatur .... [T]he Supreme Court should not have any part of
the task; rather the statute should be amended to substitute the
Judicial Conference ......
older than our political parties, older than our school system." Id. at 486.3 7
7d. at 484.
3 398 U.S. 74, 136 (1970).
9 Id. at 136 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40331 U.S. 367 (1947).
"4 Id. at 376.
42 Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 374
U.S. 861, 879 (1963). Mr. Justices Black and Douglas also added: "[W]e are opposed to
the submission of these rules to the Congress under a statute which permits them to 'take
effect' and to repeal 'all laws in conflict with such rules' without requiring any affirmative
consideration, action, or approval of the rules by Congress or the President." Id. at 86S.
In recent years Congress has taken aggressive action in regard to court rules.
[Vol. 51:1
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A few years ago 65 law school deans and professors were asked to
evaluate all the justices of the Supreme Court in order to create five
categories from "great" to "failure." '43 As might be expected, the 12
justices ranked as great were all then deceased. Mr. Justice Douglas
was included in the category of "near great."" Now that he has re-
tired, legal historians will begin to reassess his impact on American law.
One begins with his record length of service and his prodigious
capacity for opinion writing. He wrote 1,282 opinions, or an average
of 35 opinions per year.4" Each justice has traditionally written from
ten to fifteen opinions for the Court each year,46 and in the 26 years
that the Harvard Law Review has reviewed the Supreme Court terms,
Douglas fell into the traditional yield insofar as opinions of the Court
were concerned. His super-abundance came in the form of dissenting
opinions (as many as 53 in the 1972 term) and concurring opinions
(as many as 14: in the 1971 term).
In addition, however, he also wrote an inordinately large number
of dissents from the denial of certiorari. Inasmuch as it is well-known
to the bar that denial of certiorari is without precedential meaning, to
write a dissent therefrom is an act of pure principle, done with knowl-
edge that it cannot be effectively used or cited, and will possibly never
even be read.
It has been implied on occasion that Mr. Justice Douglas' prolificacy
has been at the sacrifice of craftsmanship, and perhaps in such things
as the virtually meaningless dissents from the denial of certiorari this
is true. However, his opinions for the Court and his major dissents,
although often brief, are effectively incisive. In all areas of endeavor
the Justice has been both forceful and fearless.
Mr. Justice Douglas has been a judicial activist, a great civil liber-
tarian, and the foremost defender of first amendment rights. Without
question history will place him on the list of great jurists.
41 Blaustein & Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.BA.J. 1183 (1972).
44John Marshall received the highest rating; the most contemporary of the 12 were
Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Earl Warren. Id.
-45 Justice Douglas also wrote 26 books, at a rate of one a year since 1950.
41 In the 1973 term, Mr. Justice White wrote 19 opinions of the Court; Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist each wrote 17, and Mr. Justice Powell wrote 16. This, however, is an un-
usually heavy yield.
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